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I. INTRODUCTION
The Cleveland Browns ended the 1989-1990 football season with the
best record in the American Football Conference Central Division', just
one game short of a trip to the Super Bowl,2 and with high hopes for the
following season. During the off-season, however, the acquisition of play-
ers through Plan B Free Agency,3 at pay significantly higher than that
of many veteran players of comparable ability, resulted in ominous re-
percussions felt throughout the team, as seen most notably in the contract
holdouts of four of the Browns most valued players. 4 The Browns finished
IAssociated Press Sports News, December 24, 1989, AM Cycle. The Browns
finished the 1989-90 season with a record of nine wins, six loses, and one tie. Id.
2 Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 15, 1990, at ID. The Browns beat the Buffalo
Bills by a score of 34-31 in the first round of the AFC Playoffs, but went on to
lose to the Denver Broncos 37-21 in the AFC Championship Game. Id.
3Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DUKE L.J. 339,347. Plan B Free Agency is the system implemented by the League
owners that requires each team to designate 37 players on their final rosters that
will be deemed "protected". Id. The remaining players will be allowed to negotiate
with, and sign contracts with other teams in the League, with no compensation
due the original team. Id. For further discussion on Plan B Free Agency, see infra
note 145 and accompanying text.
4Tony Grossi, Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 24, 1990, at 5C col. 1. The holdouts
included Frank Minnifield, Felix Wright, Clay Matthews and Mike Johnson, with
Minnifield and Matthews as the most outspoken about Raymond Clayborn's (a
Plan B acquisition) contract. Id. As illustrated by Matthews' comments, the new
salary structure created a good deal of unrest amongst veteran Browns. "Our
approach when we sat down was to take Clayborn's figure and add a spread that
I felt would be fair based on what I've accomplished [with the Browns]." Id. at
1C. Matthews was preparing to enter his 13th season with the Browns. Id.
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the 1990-1991 season in the cellar of the National Football League, having
lost more games than in any other season in the team's forty-four year
history.5 While no one in Cleveland is willing to attribute the Browns'
exceptionally poor season solely to the holdouts, the resentment sur-
rounding the resolution of these negotiations clearly contributed to the
Browns' demise. The tale of the Browns' ignominious 1990 season serves
to illustrate the counter-productive and destructive nature of the restric-
tion of player movement in the National Football League [hereinafter
"NFL" or "the League"].
The most recent development in the on-going dispute between the play-
ers and team owners came on January 7, 1991, when the United States
Supreme Court declined to review the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Powell v. National Football League.6 This decision immunized
the League's player restriction policies from antitrust scrutiny by holding
that the non-statutory labor exemption to the Sherman Act continues in
effect so long as the labor relationship between the League and the Players
Union continues. While the Court's refusal to grant certiorari in this case
culminated a three year court battle pitting the National Football League
Players Association [hereinafter "the Union" or "NFLPA"] against the
National Football League and its member teams, the battle is likely to
soon be renewed as individual players have begun to file antitrust actions
against the League in various district courts.
The purpose of this article is to offer guidance to courts and attorneys
faced with the issue of determining the point in time that the non-stat-
utory labor exemption terminates in the context of NFL labor relations
and to propose a system of free agency which might ease this conflict
between the League and players. To that end, this article begins by ex-
ploring the history of player relations in the NFL, the development of
the Union and the subsequent collective bargaining agreements between
the Players Association and the League. This is followed by an in-depth
analysis of Powell v. NFL and a discussion of the policies of Labor Law
and Antitrust Law in the context of professional football. This discussion
5 CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, December 31, 1990, at 1A. The Browns closed out
the 1990-1991 regular season with a dismal record of three wins and thirteen
losses - the most losses in franchise history.
I Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) cert. denied,
11 S. Ct. 711 (1991) [Hereinafter Powell v. NFL]. "89-1421 Powell v. National
Football League. Ruling below (CA 8, 888 F2d 559, 58 LW 2289): Non-statutory
labor exemption to antitrust laws does not expire when parties have reached
impasse in negotiations after expiration of collective bargaining agreement, but
instead continues as long as there is possibility that parties may resort to array
of labor law remedies available to them after impasse." 59 U.S.L.W. 3453, (Jan-
uary 8, 1991).
The instant case, originally brought in a district court in Minnesota by eight
NFL players and the Union, alleged that the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System was a restraint of trade in violation of Secs. 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
See infra notes 106-125 and accompanying text.
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focuses on the crucial question of the appropriate point in time for the
non-statutory labor exemption to expire, allowing the players to seek
antitrust relief. Finally, this article will culminate in the proposal of an
alternative system of free agency as it might be implemented in a future
collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the collective bar-
gaining representative of the players.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE NFL, THE NFLPA AND PLAYER RELATIONS
To understand the conflict between the NFL and the Union and the
issue in Powell, one must begin with a brief history of labor relations in
the NFL. The National Football League came into being in 1920 as an
unincorporated association comprised of member clubs.' The League per-
forms various administrative operations including organizing and sched-
uling games and implementing a system of rules that govern play in the
NFL.8 In 1956, the Players Association was formed but did not receive
recognition from the owners until 1957 following the Supreme Court's
decision in Radovich v. National Football League.9 In Radovich, the Court
ruled that the League and its practices are subject to the antitrust laws
of the Sherman Act.' 0
After this decision in 1957, recognition of the NFLPA came when the
Union threatened antitrust litigation against League owners." Shortly
thereafter, any alleged antitrust violations by the NFL were dispelled
when a competitive entity, the American Football League [hereinafter
"AFL"], was founded.1 2 As a consequence, the Union lost the leverage
that had forced initial recognition, and there was little meaningful bar-
gaining from 1957 to 1966.13
In 1966, the NFL and AFL began a merger agreement that was to
become effective in 1970.14 Soon after merger plans were announced, the
Leagues appealed to Congress in an effort to avoid the renewed threat of
7 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
81d.
9 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Bill Radovich, a NFL player with the Detroit Lions
requested a transfer to a west coast team in 1946 to be near his ill father. Id. at
448. After the Lions denied the trade, Radovich broke his contract. Id. In 1948,
the San Francisco Clippers, of the Pacific Coast Football League, offered a contract
to Radovich to become their player coach, but rescinded the offer when told by
the NFL that he had been "blacklisted." Id. In a suit for treble damages against
the NFL under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court declared that the NFL was
liable under the antitrust laws. Id.
, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
Oversight Hearings on National Football League Labor-Management Dispute:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Cong.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1975) [hereinafter Hear-
ings].
12 Id.
17 Id.
Id. at 4. At this time, the players in the two leagues were each represented
by separate Players Associations, neither of which had attained recognition by
League owners. Upon completion of League merger in 1970, the separate Players
Associations also merged to form the Union as it exists today. Id.
1991]
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antitrust litigation. As a result, Congress enacted legislation that sanc-
tioned the merger between the NFL and the AFL and created an ex-
emption shielding the leagues from antitrust liability.15 The following
year, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters mounted an organi-
zational campaign within the League. 6 As an increasing number of play-
ers signed authorization cards with the Teamsters, the League owners
sat down with the players Union and negotiated a two-year contract that
became effective in 1968.17 At the expiration of the 1968 contract between
the Union and the League in 1970, the Players Union sought recognition
from the Owners as the collective bargaining agent of all the players and
expressed the desire to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement
with the NFL.18 Following a series of bitter negotiations, a consent elec-
tion agreement was entered into on July 10, 1970, and certification was
received in January, 1971.19
While the negotiations of 1970 did result in a four-year collective bar-
gaining agreement, they were marked by a brief lock-out by the owners2°
and the first in a series of union strikes that have characterized the labor
relations in football ever since. One consideration on the Union's agenda
in 1970 concerned league restrictions on the players' right to move from
team to team.21 In particular, the Union opposed the player restrictions
embodied in a League policy known as the "Rozelle Rule".22
Following the expiration of the 1970 agreement on January 31, 1974,
negotiations over player restrictions deteriorated rapidly to the point
where the Union chose to strike rather than to continue futile talks.23
While initially unified in the strike, rookies and free agents began to
report to camp, and after 44 days, the strike was broken, and the veterans
returned to the playing field without a collective bargaining agreement. 24
15 See Lock, supra note 3, at 407. This exemption, allowing the Leagues to
merge, has eliminated all competition for college football talent which in turn
has contributed to the unequal bargaining power between the League and the
Players Union. Prior to the merger, the NFL and the AFL competed for college
talent, contributing to the necessity of organized player representation. After the
merger, threat of Union economic action diminished with the occupational alter-
natives for pro football players. Id.
10 See Hearings, supra note 11, at 4.
17 Id.
11 Id. As the unions for the NFL and AFL merged to form the NFLPA and
attained recognition by the players as their collective bargaining representative,
the Union sought League recognition and to initiate collective bargaining. Id.
19Id.
20 See Hearings, supra note 11, at 4.
21 Id. at 4-5.
22 Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 2, Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d
559 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, (No. 89-1421).* [hereinafter Amicus Brie]. The
Rozelle Rule, in place from 1963 to 1976, called for a system of compensation for
the acquisition of free agents solely at the discretion of the NFL commissioner,
Peter Rozelle. If a team wished to acquire a free agent, Rozelle would assign a
series of draft choices and veteran players as due the player's original team. Id.
*(On file with the Cleueland State Law Reveiw.)
21 Id. at 2-3.
- Id. at 3.
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However, the challenge to the Rozelle Rule continued on a new battle-
field-the courts.
25
In Mackey v. NFL,26 a federal district court found that the Rozelle Rule
was in fact a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 27 This
ruling came over the claims of League owners that restrictions on player
mobility were shielded from antitrust liability by the non-statutory labor
exemption .2 On appeal, the district court's ruling was affirmed, 29 but the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a rule of reason analysis in
reaching its decision. 0 The Eighth Circuit in Mackey, set forth a three
part test in determining whether the non-statutory labor exemption
should act to shield a particular restriction from antitrust liability.31
While the Rozelle Rule was, in this context, found to meet the first two
parts of the test (namely, that the restraint primarily effects only the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement, and that the terms of the
restriction concern mandatory subjects of bargaining), the court found
that the Rule was unilaterally implemented by the owners, and not a
product of arms-length negotiations. 32 Upon reaching the conclusion un-
der its analysis that the Rozelle Rule was not exempt from antitrust
liability, the court proceeded to apply a Rule of Reason analysis, 33 and
held that the Rozelle Rule was too restrictive of player mobility, and that
a less restrictive means could be implemented to meet the owners' in-
terests.
34
Victory for the Union in the courts did not equate to victory at the
bargaining table in 1977. Legal fees had been excessive and had left the
Union in serious financial trouble. Cessation of funding to player pensions
by management was also serving to weaken player support for the
Union.2 5 These pressures, in concert with the League's refusal to exhibit
flexibility regarding player restrictions forced the Union to submit to a
five year agreement that included the Right of First Refusal/Compen-
sation System [hereinafter "the System"], a relatively limited modifica-
tion of the Rozelle Rule2 6 The System essentially recreated the series of
21 See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.Minn. 1975).
26 Id.
27 See Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), and see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
21 Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1982), and 407 F. Supp. 1000.
See also infra notes 67-105 and accompanying text.
21 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
30 Id.; See also infra note 72 and accompanying text.
3, 543 F.2d at 614, and infra note 105 and accompanying text.
32 Id.
32 Id. and infra note 72 and accompanying text.
"1 543 F.2d at 621-622.
31 See Lock, supra note 3, at 360.
11 See 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Football
League Management Council and the National Football League Players Asso-
ciation, art. XV (March 1 , 1977) [hereinafter "1977 Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment"]. The system established that:
1991]
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player restraints embodied in the Rozelle Rule, eliminating only the role
of the commissioner in the process and the use of veteran players as a
part of the compensation.
3 7
Under the new system, the level of compensation due the original team
consists of a combination of draft choices, as determined by reference to
the acquired player's new salary level that is offered by the acquiring
team.3 While this system served to clarify the compensation a player
would merit, it did not serve to provide an environment of free agency
movement within the League. During the five year term of the 1977
Collective Bargaining Agreement, only one player changed teams via the
Right of First Refusal/Compensation route.29 As a result, free agency and
a reformed system of player mobility remained the priority at the onset
of negotiations in 1982.
In effect, the Union took the position that individual salary negotiations
and the System would never bring the players an equitable share of league
revenues, even if they were able to force the owners to modify the status
quo through collective bargaining. 40 After the expiration of the 1977
agreement, the Union submitted a proposal calling for a fixed percentage
of League revenues that was to be deposited monthly into a league-wide
compensation fund which would then be distributed to players according
to a wage scale based solely on seniority in the league.41 The League, in
contrast, adopted a position in complete opposition to the Union proposal
"[w]ithout regard to what the percentage [was]" 42 and insisted on the
renewal of the System without amendment in the 1982 agreement.43
Negotiations prior to the 1982 season progressed to a stalemate, with
neither side giving ground towards compromise on the free agency system.
Two games into the season, the Union chose to use the most powerful
[E]very NFL club retains rights to "its players" even though, in the case of
veteran free agents, contract rights to a player no longer exist. When a
veteran player's contract has expired and a competing NFL club makes an
offer to that player, the player's old team may keep that player simply by
matching the competing offer; the player's old club therefore is said to have
a "right of first refusal" as to the player's services. If the competing offer
is large enough, and the club to which the player was previously under
contract does not choose to match a competing offer, the old club will receive
draft choice "compensation" which may be extremely costly to the acquiring
club.
Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 779 (D.Minn. 1988).
37 678 F. Supp. at 779.
38 Id.
3 678 F.Supp. at 782. The one player to change teams under that system was
Norm Thompson, who moved from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Baltimore Colts
in 1977. The Colts, under the terms of the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement,
gave up their 1978 third round draft choice to the St. Louis Cardinals as com-
pensation. Frank Latsky, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1990, at 1 C.
40 See Lock, supra note 3, at 361.
41 Id. at 362.
42 Id. The Union's proposal called for a 55 percent share of league revenues to
fund the system. Id.
43/d.
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economic weapon provided under the federal labor laws and went out on
strike in an effort to break the deadlock at the bargaining table.44 In
retrospect, this 55 day strike was the most effective work stoppage ever
implemented by the Union, as it enjoyed a fair amount of success in court
and with the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter, NLRB], and
provided a more potent adversary for League owners.
Perhaps the most significant battle won by the Union was one that was
short lived, but nevertheless monumental. The standard player contract
includes two paragraphs referred to as the Exclusive Rights Provisions,
which effectively prohibit the NFL players from participating in non-
league sponsored football games.45 In an effort to generate income, and
demonstrate economic independence, the Union planned and scheduled
a series of all-star games46 to be played by the players outside the auspices
of the League. In response, several team owners sent letters to their
players threatening legal action against those participating in the games
under the Exclusive Rights Provisions of the player contracts.47
The Union then petitioned the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia to enjoin team owners from taking legal action in the various state
courts to prevent individual players from participating in non-league
44 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D.Minn. 1988).
45The Exclusive Rights Provisions, paragraphs two and three of the Standard
Players Contract provides as follows:
2. EMPLOYMENT AND SERVICES. Club employs Player as a skilled
football player. Player accepts such employment. He agrees to give his best
efforts and loyalty to the Club, and to conduct himself on and off the field
with appropriate recognition of fact that the success of professional football
depends largely on public respect for and approval of those associated with
the game. Player will report promptly for and participate fully in Club's
official pre-season training camp, all Club meeting and practice sessions,
and all pre-season, regular-season and post-season football games scheduled
for and by Club. If invited, player will practice for and play in any all-star
football game sponsored by the League. Player will not participate in
any football game not sponsored by the League.
3. OTHER ACTIVITIES. Without prior written consent of the Club, Player
will not play football or engage in activities related to football oth-
erwise than for Club, or otherwise engage in any activity other than
football which may involve significant risk of personal injury. Player rep-
resents that he has special, exceptional and unique knowledge, skill ability
and experience as a football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated
with any certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by dam-
ages. Player, therefore, agrees that Club will have the right, in ad-
dition to any other right which Club may possess, to enjoin Player
by appropriate proceedings from playing football or engaging in foot-
ball-related activities other than for the Club or from engaging in any
activity other than football which may involve a significant risk of personal
injury.
1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
and the National Football League Players Association, Paragraphs Two and
Three.(emphasis added)
" See Lock, supra note 3, at 363.
47 Id.
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sponsored games. 48 The Union also asked the court to declare the Exclu-
sive Rights Provisions of the players contracts unenforceable during the
pendency of the strike, or outside of a current Collective Bargaining
Agreement. 49 Though the court denied the Union's motion for declaratory
judgment regarding the Exclusive Rights Provisions, it did enjoin the
League from taking action against individual players in state courts,
temporarily opening the door to the non-league sponsored all-star
games.50
On October 17 and 18, 1982, the Union proceeded with two non-League
all-star games in Washington D.C. and Los Angeles. Though attendance
was low, the Union's ability to organize and effectuate non-league games
improved the Union's stature at the bargaining table.51 However, before
the Union was able to proceed with the third scheduled all-star game,
the League appealed the district court ruling in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which reversed the district court's order.52
Finally, on December 11, 1982, after a 57-day strike by the NFL players,
a Collective Bargaining Agreement was reached between the Union and
the League. 53 As a part of the agreement, all charges before the NLRB
were withdrawn by the Union.5 4 In the 1982 agreement, the Union won
a substantial package of employee benefits totalling in excess of $1.2
billion dollars over the term of the five-year agreement.55 In addition, the
18 See NFLPA v. NFL, No. 82-2728, slip op. (D.D.C. October 6, 1982).
49 Id.
10 Id. at 4. The court reasoned that the Union would suffer irreparable harm
if forced to defend individual players in multiple state court actions, and that the
League would not be unduly prejudiced if required to consolidate any action taken
against individual players. Id. In addition to the litigation in the federal district
court, the Union also sought action before the NLRB, filing eleven unfair labor
practice charges including a Refusal to Bargain charge against the League, see
NLRB case number 2-CA-18923. As a part of the Refusal to Bargain charge filed
on July 8, 1982, the Union requested an injunction under section 10(j) of the
NLRA in an effort to compel the owners to bargain in good faith. The memoran-
dum from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB cited the League's
insistence that player compensation be negotiated, at least in part, on an indi-
vidual basis constituted an 8(a)(5) Refusal to Bargain. On October 29, 1982, five
weeks into the Union strike, the NLRB issued a complaint against the NFL
consolidating four of the unfair labor practice charges filed by the Union. However,
the Board declined to seek 10(j) relief as part of the consolidated complaint. Id.
11 See, e.g., Frank Litsky, N.Y. TIMES, October 18, 1982 at C4 (the NFC beat
the AFC 23-22 on a 45 yard field goal by Mark Mosely in RFK Stadium in
Washington D.C. before an announced attendance of 8760); and N.Y. TIMES, Oc-
tober 19, 1982 at A27, (the AFC beat the NFC 31-27 on a 54 yard pass from Ed
Luther to Theotis Brown in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum before an an-
nounced crowd of 5331).
52 NFL v. NFLPA, No. 82-2200 (D.C. Cir. filed October 8,1982) (unreported).
" Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 12, 1982 at D1.
Settlement Agreement for the Purpose of Resolving Unfair Labor Practice
Charges Filed by the NFLPA against the NFLMC (Dec. 11, 1982) (as executed by
Ed Garvey and Jack Donlon on behalf of the Union and the NFL respectively.)
15 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).
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agreement included modification of the System, primarily increasing the
salary levels at which draft choice compensation would be triggered for
players changing teams under the system.56 However, the modifications
did not account for any increase in the mobility of free agents in the
NFL.57 In fact, from 1977 to 1987, only one free agent signed with another
team, demonstrating the restrictive nature of the System.5 8
As a result of this lack of player mobility, the Union sought further
modification of the system at the expiration of the 1982 contract in 1987. 59
Again, negotiations proved tense and unproductive, and after playing
only one game of the regular season, the Union called another strike on
September 22, 1987.60 The most notable difference between the 1987
strike and the strike in 1982 was the success of the League bringing in
replacement players to break the will of the Union.6 1 After missing just
one week of the regular season, the League continued with the games
scheduled for 1987.62 Though the games were not attended by large
crowds, they were televised by the networks as scheduled, and one can
conclude that they had a significant impact on the solidarity of the Union.
By the second week of the strike, Union players began to break from the
ranks and cross the picket lines. 63 After the third week of the replacement
games, the strike ended and the players returned to work.64 It was at this
point in time, marked by the players return to camp without a collective
bargaining agreement, that the NFLPA returned to the courts in search
of relief by filing the initial pleadings for Powell v. NFL in a federal
district court in Minnesota.6 5
III. THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION AS IT APPLIES TO THE
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL/COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN THE NFL
The issue that came before the Supreme Court in the Union's petition
for certiorari in Powell was the time at which the non-statutory labor
6 Id.
- See Amicus Brief, supra note 22 at 5.Id. Wilbur Marshall was the player to switch teams from the Chicago Bears
to the Washington Redskins for a series of draft choices. Thomas George, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 1988, at Sec. 8, p. 1.
19 Appellant's Petition for Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit at 5, Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (no. 89-5091),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991). (On file with the Cleveland State Law Review.)
60 888 F.2d at 561.
61 Michael Janofsky, Sparse Crowds, Heavy Picketing at NFL Games N.Y.
TIMES, October 5, 1987 § 1, at 1).
62 Id.
See Lock, supra note 3, at 367.
4 Id.
6 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).
1991]
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exemption shielding the System from antitrust liability expires. 6 To put
this question in its legal context, this section provides a detailed analysis
of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions to it. More specifically, it explores the development of the
non-statutory labor exemption and its application to labor policies in the
NFL, providing a close look at the various expiration points proposed by
the parties, the Federal District Court, and that supplied by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
A. Antitrust Law and Restrictions on Trade
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted by Congress on July 2, 1890
for the purpose of promoting competition.6 7 The most significant sections
of the Sherman Act were introduced to eliminate unlawful restraint of
trade and monopolization. 8 More specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman
Act makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination .. . or conspiracy in
restraint of trade" in interstate or foreign commerce.6 9 Section 2 of the
Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing, attempts to monopolize and com-
binations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign
commerce.
0 As most contracts limit or restrain trade to some extent,
71
Section 1 of the Sherman Act could be read to prohibit many legitimate
and necessary business activities. As a result, the Supreme Court acted
66 Appellant's Petition for certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit at 3-4, Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-
5091), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991). (On file with the Cleveland State Law
Review.)
67 Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. 1-7 (1982).
68 Id. at §§ 1, 2.
69 Id. at § 1. Section 1 provides:
[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
Id.
70 Id. at § 2. Section 2 reads,
[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
71 LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 165-
166 (1977).
[Vol. 39:385
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss3/17
N.F.L. PLAYER DISPUTE
through a series of cases in the early 1900's 72 to interpret Section 1 to
prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.
This method of judicial inquiry was utilized in Mackey, 73 where the
federal district court applied a per se analysis74 in holding that the Rozelle
Rule was violative of the Sherman Act. The court reasoned that the
Rozelle Rule 75 operated to limit negotiations between clubs and free
agents, and to therefore limit player mobility.7 6 In this context, the court
concluded that the Rozelle Rule was analogous to a group boycott, and a
concerted refusal to deal. 77 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
also found the Rozelle Rule to be violative of the Sherman Act, but took
exception to the district court's per se reasoning.78 The Court then pro-
72 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
(included considerations of principles of law and public policy in evaluating
whether an anti-competitive act violates antitrust law); Chicago Board of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Over the years, the Court has developed
two standards by which the reasonableness of a restraint of trade is to be tested.
The first such standard, the per se rule, was developed in the landmark case
of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Under the
per se rule, restraints of trade are held to be violative of antitrust law when
deemed inherently unreasonable. Id. at 5. The per se standard is applied when
a court is sufficiently familiar with the type of restraint challenged, providing
sufficient experience with the practice to rule that it is inherently unreasonable.
The Court in Northern Pacific reasoned that, "there are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." Id. at 5. As noted in Mackey, restraints of trade
that have been held in violation of the Sherman Act under the per se rule include
group boycotts, price fixing and concerted refusals to deal.
The second standard adopted by the Court to determine the reasonableness of
a restraint is the Rule of Reason. The essential analysis under the rule of reason
is whether the restraint in question is no more restrictive than necessary, and is
justified by legitimate business purposes, see, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); and Worthen Bank and Trust Co. v. National
Bank Americard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973) In applying the rule of reason
analysis, there must be extensive judicial inquiry into the kind of restraint in
question, its purpose and effect, JOHN C. WEISTART AND CYM H. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 592 (1979). Factors considered include the nature
of the business; the history, purpose and effect of the restraint; the existence of
less restrictive alternatives; and a balance of pro-competitive and anti-competitive
effects. The rule of reason analysis is best applied to restraints in industries with
which the court has little familiarity or experience, Standard Oil of New Jersey
v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911)(per se rule with complex and varied business
transactions); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (not enough
known about the restraints involved to apply a per se analysis).
73 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.Minn. 1975).
14 MACKEY V. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976); See also supra, note 72
for detailed explanation of the Per Se analysis.
75 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618; see also supra note 72 and see Amicus Brief, supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
7r Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618; see also supra note 72; and see Amicus Brief, supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
77 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618; see also supra note 72; and see Amicus Brief, supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
78 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
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ceeded to apply the rule of reason standard in analyzing the Rozelle Rule,
framing the inquiry in terms of whether the restraint imposed was jus-
tified by legitimate business purposes and was no more restrictive than
necessary. 79 The Court of Appeals found that there was in fact sufficient
evidence to substantiate the Union's claims of antitrust violations.8 0
Prior to reaching this conclusion, the court in Mackey had to review
the league's claim that the non-statutory labor exemption' 1 would act to
immunize the league from liability under the antitrust laws. Since this
claim became the paramount issue in Powell,8 2 it is helpful to describe
the background and development of the labor exemption before further
discussing the Powell case.
B. The Labor Exemption
On October 15, 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act,
designed to further develop and clarify antitrust law. 3 Sections 6 and 20
of the Clayton Act contain the statutory labor exemption from the an-
titrust laws.8 4 The intent of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, in concert
with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, signed into law in March of 1932, 5 was
to exempt labor unions from liability under the antitrust laws, as they
are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.8 6 As the Mackey
court reasoned, "the statutory exemption was created to insulate legiti-
mate collective activity by employees, which is inherently anticompetitive
but is favored by federal labor policy, from the proscriptions of the an-
titrust laws.8
7
While the statutory exemption has been held to protect concerted ac-
tivity by employees from liability under the antitrust laws, 8 it has not
been extended to protect concerted activity or agreements between unions
and employers. As a result, the Supreme Court has developed a limited
non-statutory labor exemption to protect certain collective bargaining
agreements between unions and employers from antitrust scrutiny.
As noted above, the non-statutory labor exemption was established by
the Supreme Court as a derivation of the statutory labor exemption, which
"has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of em-
ployees."8' 8 It is in this context that the Court recognized the necessity of
79 Id.
- Id.
81 See infra notes 104-125 and accompanying text.
82 Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1982).
Id. at 88 6 and 20.
85 Norris-LaGuardia Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
17 Id. (Mackey court quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)).
- See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965).19 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
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insulating both parties to a collective bargaining agreement that included
restraints on trade as a result of good faith negotiations.90
The non-statutory exemption was defined and developed through a
series of cases beginning with Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,9 1 as the Supreme
Court struck the necessary balance between the antitrust policy favoring
free competition and the policies embodied in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act favoring collective bargaining and self determination.92 Such
accommodation can be attained by according a limited non-statutory labor
exemption from antitrust liability to certain union-employer bargaining
agreements. 93 In Apex, the union called a sit-down strike after organizing
the company but failing to gain employer agreement for a closed shop
security clause. The strike became violent and resulted in the stoppage
of production for over four months. During that time, the union prevented
the shipment of finished goods into interstate commerce. Justice Stone,
writing for the Court, indicated that union activity was not violative of
antitrust laws unless the intent of the union was to control the product
market or restrain commercial competition." The Apex Court based the
exemption on the distinction between restraints on commercial compe-
tition and those designed to effectuate changes in the collective bargain-
ing agreement.93
In 1965, the Supreme Court handed down two significant decisions that
served to further define and limit the non-statutory labor exemption. In
United Mine Workers v. Pennington,6 the Phillips Coal Company alleged
that the Union had entered into a multi-employer bargaining agreement
with the larger coal miners in the area, calling for modernization of the
coal mining facilities and substantially increased wages to be imposed
on all coal mining companies in the market, regardless of whether those
companies were capable of modernization or instead remained labor in-
tensive in their production methods.9 7 In his opinion for the majority,
Justice White confirmed that a union, acting in furtherance of its mem-
bers' interests and entering into a multi-employer bargaining agreement,
is shielded from antitrust liability by the non-statutory labor exemption.98
10 See infra notes 104-125 and accompanying text.9 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
92 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976). The Mackey Court so
concluded in its summary of the non-statutory labor exemption.
1
3Id. at 611-12.
14Apex, 310 U.S. at 512 (1940).51 Id. See also U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) in which the Supreme
Court read the provisions of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in concert to determine whether union conduct violates antitrust
laws. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter found a broad exemption from
antitrust liability for a union acting in its own self interest during collective
bargaining on mandatory subjects.
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
97 Id. For the smaller coal companies, modernization was not economically
feasible, forcing them to remain labor intensive to compete. As a result, these
companies were drastically affected by the increased union wages.98 d. at 665.
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The union is also entitled to enter into similar agreements with other
employers when in the best interests of the union members. The Court
held, however, that the union's actions were not protected by the non-
statutory labor exemption because it unlawfully served the anti-compet-
itive interests of the multi-employer group. 9
The second decision addressing the labor exemption issue in 1965 was
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.,1°° which
served to re-establish the bounds of the non-statutory labor exemption.
In Jewel Tea, the collective bargaining agreement involved a multi-em-
ployer bargaining group of Chicago grocers which agreed to a restriction
on the marketing hours for fresh meat.10' This restriction was designed
to further employee interests by eliminating late working hours for union
members. 102 The Court in Jewel Tea held that the non-statutory labor
exemption was applicable to such an agreement, as the restraints in
question were embodied in a collective bargaining agreement and served
to further legitimate employee interests while restraining trade no more
than necessary to achieve these ends.'0 3
Finally, in 1977, the Eighth Circuit penned a standard by which the
scope of the exemption could be gauged. In Mackey, the court reasoned
that "the availability of the non-statutory exemption for a particular
agreement turns upon whether the relevant federal labor policy is de-
serving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under the circum-
stances of the particular case.' 1"0 4 The Mackey court went on to establish
a three-prong test under which the applicability of the non-statutory labor
exemption can be determined: (1) whether the restraint primarily affects
only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) whether the
9 Id. at 668-69.
100 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
"I, Id. One can conclude that it was the intent of the grocers in Jewel Tea to
enter into this agreement and then contest it in the courts and before the NLRB.
102Id.
1
03 Id. at 688-90. See also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). In Connell, the Supreme Court was again
faced with a situation in which a union was acting outside the realm of the non-
statutory labor exemption. A bargaining representative for plumbers and workers
in the mechanical trades, approached Connell Construction Co., a general build-
ing contractor in Dallas, seeking a commitment from Connell to subcontract
mechanical work only to those firms already under contract with the union. Id.
at 619. Connell refused Local 100's demands, and the union responded by picketing
one of Connell's main construction sites. Id. at 620. As a result, almost 150 people
walked off the job. In reviewing the development of the non-statutory labor ex-
emption, its purpose, and its role in this context, the Court reiterated that it
serves to shield some restraints on trade, but could not be relied upon to protect
a situation such as that in Connell, where a union and a non-labor party agree
to restrain competition in a business market. Id. at 622-23. The Court held that
this type of restraint would not even be exempt from antitrust liability had it
been included in a lawful collective bargaining agreement, let alone in an un-
lawful contract such as this. Id. at 626. Again, the Supreme Court's opinion served
to limit the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption.
- Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976).
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terms of the restriction concern a mandatory subject of bargaining; and
(3) whether the inclusion of the restriction in the collective bargaining
agreement is the product of bona fide arms-length negotiations. 1 5 While
the ruling in Mackey served to clarify the non-statutory labor exemption
and its applicability to terms embodied in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, it does not provide any insight into the status of the exemption
following expiration of such a shielded collective agreement. It is this
precise question that faced the courts in Powell v. NFL.
C. Powell v. NFL
On October 15, 1987, the final day of a 24-day strike, the Union and
several NFL players filed antitrust actions against the National Football
League in a Minnesota District Court. In each of the suits filed, the Union
alleged that the continuation of the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System by the NFL beyond the expiration of the 1982 Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.'0 6 In
late November of 1987, the Union moved for a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the League from continuing to restrict player movement under the
System, and for a partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the
restraints were still protected by the non-statutory labor exemption from
liability under the antitrust laws.'0 7 The League filed a cross motion for
summary judgment asserting that the non-statutory labor exemption
shielded the System from liability under the Sherman Act."81 In its opinion
issued on January 29, 1988, the district court held that after the expi-
ration of a collective bargaining agreement, the non-statutory labor ex-
emption terminates with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining
upon impasse.10 9 The court, however, declined to determine whether an
impasse had been reached between the Union and the League with respect
to the issue of player restraints until after the NLRB had resolved League
charges that the players had not bargained in good faith.110 Following
the filing of the court's opinion, the Union notified the League that in its
view, the parties were at impasse as to the issue of free agency."'
,0- Id. at 614.
o6 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D.Minn. 1988). The players involved in
the suit were Marvin Powell of the New York Jets and Tampa Bay Buccaneers;
Brian Holloway of the New England Patriots and the Los Angeles Raiders; Mi-
chael Kenn of the Atlanta Falcons; Michael Davis of the Raiders and the San
Diego Chargers; James Lofton of the Green Bay Packers, the Raiders, and the
Buffalo Bills; Michael Luckhurst of the Falcons; Dan Marino of the Miami Dol-
phins; George Martin of the New York Giants; and Steve Jordan of the Minnesota
Vikings. Bob Oates, Rich Roberts, L.A. TIMES, September 22, 1987, at Part 3,
page 1.
107 Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1989).
lob Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
109 Id. at 788.
"'Id. at 789.
Powell, 888 F.2d at 562-563.
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On April 28, 1988 two advice memoranda were issued by the office of
the General Counsel of the NLRB finding that the parties had been at
impasse since October 11, 1987, but declining to issue a complaint against
the Union for bad faith negotiations.11 2 As a result of these memoranda,
the League withdrew its unfair labor practice charges against the
Union.'
Following the league withdrawal of the refusal to bargain charges, the
Union renewed its motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Lea-
gue from continuing the System," 4 and moved for summary judgment
asserting that the non-statutory labor exemption had indeed expired at
impasse. 15 On June 17, 1988, the district court granted the Union's mo-
tion for summary judgment, holding that the parties had reached an
impasse as of that date, and that the System was no longer shielded from
antitrust scrutiny.16 As to the issue of the preliminary injunction, the
district court refused to enjoin the League, holding that it lacked juris-
diction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act" 7 to grant such relief in a labor
dispute." 8
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling grant-
ing the NFLPA's motion for summary judgment.119 Over a stinging dis-
sent, ' 20 the court held that the non-statutory labor exemption does not
terminate upon impasse, but instead continues on so long as the labor
relationship between the League and the Players Union continues.1 2 '
Although the System has never been adjudicated as violative of antitrust
law, absent the Eighth Circuit's holding, the League could not continue
to evade antitrust liability and maintain its policies regarding free
agency. 22
In a move calculated to improve the players' chances to seek relief from
League restraints on movement, the Union Executive Committee voted
to abandon its bargaining rights and decertify as the bargaining repre-
"'Id. at 563.
113 Id. The NFL withdrew its charges despite the fact that the memorandum
was based on staff analysis and not an adversarial hearing.
114 Id.
l' Id. Note that the Union also alleged violations in the League college draft
and its continued adherence to the uniform player contract, constituting addi-
tional unlawful player restraints under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Because these
issues were not a part of the Eighth Circuit ruling, they are beyond the scope of
this article.
1' Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D.Minn. 1988).
"7 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 105-115 (1982).
"' 690 F. Supp. at 818.
"' Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1989).
2oId. at 568-572.
121 Id. at 568.
122 Id. at 573-574. Chief Judge Lay, dissenting from the Court's denial of re-
hearing en banc, reasoned that, "this court's unprecedented decision leads to the
ineluctable result of union decertification in order to invoke rights to which the
players are clearly entitled under the antitrust laws ... [and the union] should
not be compelled ... to accept illegal restraints it deems undesirable." Id.
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sentative of the NFL players.'2 3 Bolstered by the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari, individual players have begun to file petitions in federal
district courts seeking relief from the restrictive policies of the NFL.
1 24
The lawsuits filed contemplate substantially the same allegations of an-
titrust violation as asserted in Powell, but do not include the Union as a
party, and should therefore fall outside the standard established by the
Eighth Circuit. As union decertification is likely to meet the Eighth
Circuit standard as the "end of the labor relationship," these individual
suits are likely to result in the termination of the labor exemption thereby
opening the door to antitrust scrutiny of the System.1
25
In retrospect, it is expected that all of this individual court action could
have been avoided had the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Eighth
113 See Letter from Gene Upshaw to Jack Donlan, (November 6, 1989). The
letter provides in pertinent part:
[t]he NFLPA Executive Committee has voted to abandon bargaining rights
and begin decertification process. This action was made necessary by the
Eighth Circuit's decision, which purports to extend the NFLPA's labor ex-
emption to your illegal activities. We did not form our union to allow you
to illegally restrain trade in the market for player services. The players
would rather protect their rights as independent contractors than to subject
themselves to the monopolistic whims of the NFL and its clubs. Appellant's
Petition for Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit at 62A, Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-5091),
cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991). (On file with the Cleveland State Law
Review).
Id. See also Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991):
On November 3, 1989, the NFLPA's Executive Committee voted to renounce
collective bargaining. On November 6, 1989, the Committee advised the
NFL defendants that it would no longer engage in collective bargaining or
represent players in grievances. Approximately sixty-two percent of the
active players signed petitions revoking the authority of the NFLPA or any
other entity to engage in collective bargaining on their behalf. On December
5, 1989, the NFLPA's player representatives unanimously adopted new
bylaws that ended the organization's status as a collective bargaining rep-
resentative. Under the new bylaws, no officer, employee or member of the
NFLPA is authorized to discuss, deal or negotiate with the NFL or any of
its member clubs or their agents. The NFLPA thus terminated its status
as a labor organization.
Id. at 1356.
114 WASH. POST, June 12, 1990, at C2 (discussing antitrust suit filed by New
York Jets running back Freeman McNeil, Mark Collins and Lee Rouson of the
New York Giants, Green Bay quarterback Don Majkowski, Irv Eatman of the
Kansas City Chiefs, Niko Noga of the Detroit Lions, Phoenix Cardinals defensive
back Tim McDonald, and Dave Richards of the San Diego Chargers).
125 This prognostication has already begun to be realized, as the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota ruled in Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351
(D. Minn. 1991) that the labor exemption no longer operates to protect NFL actions
from antitrust scrutiny. The court, in reaching this conclusion, granted plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, holding that "the Plaintiffs are no longer
part of an 'ongoing collective bargaining relationship' with the Defendants[NFL]."
Id. at 1358. In so holding, the court reasoned that the end of the bargaining
relationship met the standard established in Powell, and therefore resulted in
the end of the labor exemption. The full impact of this ruling will become apparent
in the trial on the merits scheduled to begin February 17, 1992. Note also that
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which penned the Powell decision, denied
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Circuit Court of Appeals. Forcing the Union to decertify in order to bring
the System under antitrust scrutiny is an unwarranted consequence of
the Eighth Circuit's holding. A union should not be required to decertify
in order for its members to seek justice. To escape the deleterious con-
sequences of the Eighth Circuit's holding, a more appropriate standard
should have been implemented to signal the end of the League's antitrust
shield. The following discussion will detail the various termination points
for the labor exemption submitted by the parties, the district court and
the Eighth Circuit, and will include an alternative standard by which
the exemption may be reviewed.
D. Expiration of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Throughout the history of Powell v. NFL, there have been several points
in time asserted by the parties and the courts as the appropriate point
for the non-statutory labor exemption to expire and for the system of
player restraints in place in the NFL since the 1977 Collective Bargaining
Agreement to come under antitrust scrutiny. At one extreme is that point
in time, urged by the players in the initial pleadings of Powell, calling
for termination of the exemption at the expiration of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement. This posture has been strongly advocated in the
writings of Ethan Lock, a renowned expert on NFL Player Relations, in
a series of articles chronicling the free agency dispute from its inception. 126
Lock's strongest argument in favor of the termination of the exemption
at expiration of the bargaining agreement is one grounded in the ideas
and policies of federal labor law and the National Labor Relations Act,
favoring collective bargaining and self determination. 127 Lock argues that
during the course of the labor relationship between the League and the
Union, the NFL has maintained an imbalance in the strength of bar-
gaining positions in its favor.'28 He reasons that the Union has utilized
every economic and legal weapon in its arsenal under the NLRA in an
effort to equalize bargaining strength and effect a change in the system
of player restraints presently in place in the NFL, but to no avail.
129 Most
the NFL's appeal of this District Court ruling on June 13, 1991. See Mike Freeman,
NFL Owners Suffer Another Legal Defeat; Players Closer to Suing for Free Agency,
WASH. POST, June 14, 1991 at G-5.
126 See, e.g., Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional
Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339; Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The
Eighth Circuit Sacks the National Football League Players Association, 67 DEN.
U. L. REV. 135 (1990): Lock, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act and
the 1982 National Football League Players Strike; Wave that Flag, 1985 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 113; Ethan Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices During the 1982 NFL
Strike, 6 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 189 (1985).
127 See Lock, supra note 3, at 397.
121 Id. Lock argues that the League negotiates from a considerably stronger
bargaining position than the Union. As a consequence to this imbalance, Lock
argues that the Union has limited economic and legal options under the NLRA.
129 Id. at 396.
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significantly, Lock cites the League's ability to crush the Union's most
recent strike in 1987 by continuing to play NFL games with replacement
players."10
While acknowledging that no party to a Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment should be entitled to invalidate bargained-for restraints during the
term of a collective agreement, Lock argues that the same policies that
the Eighth Circuit recognized in invalidating the Rozelle Rule in Mackey
warrant the termination of the non-statutory labor exemption upon ex-
piration of the bargaining agreement.' 3' According to Lock, if a party
becomes unable to gain concessions at the bargaining table, there can be
no true bona fide arms-length negotiations. 132 It is in this vein that Lock
supports the Union's original position that the non-statutory labor ex-
emption and the Collective Bargaining Agreement should be coterminus.
At the other extreme is the position taken by the League throughout
the course of Powell and in fact, dating back to its assertions in Mackey.
The League has argued that once the restraints in question have been
incorporated into a Collective Bargaining Agreement that (1) primarily
affects only the parties to the agreement; (2) that concerns mandatory
subjects of bargaining; and (3) that is a product of bona fide, arms-length
negotiations, such restrictions are shielded from antitrust liability ad
infinitum.1 3 3 Arguing for the preeminence of labor law and its policy
interests over those of antitrust law, the League asserts that the ONLY
forum for resolution of these matters is the bargaining table and exclu-
sively between the parties. 34 To support its position, the League offered
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters135 in which the Supreme Court reasoned that unions
130 Id. at 396. Lock reasons that the viability of the League replacement games
has virtually eliminated the potential impact of a strike or the threat of strike
on the League at the bargaining table. Unlike the steel industry or the auto
industry, where employers are drawing from a limited pool of employees, the NFL
enjoys the advantage of drawing from prospective NFL players numbering in the
millions, and could therefore withstand a strike by the players of indefinite du-
ration.
131 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976). In his article published
in the Duke Law Journal, Lock reasoned that
[t]he requirement of good faith, arms-length negotiations suggests that the
Union must be strong enough to extract some concessions from manage-
ment. At some point the parties relative bargaining positions are so unequal
that the agreement is not the product of arms-length negotiations. In those
cases, such an agreement clearly fails to properly accommodate competing
antitrust and labor policies.
See Lock, supra note 3, at 397-398.
132 See Lock, supra note 3, at 397.
133 Neil K. Roman, Illegal Procedure: The National Football League Players
Union's Improper Use of Antitrust Litigation for Purposes of Collective Bargaining,
67 DEN. U. L. REV. 111 (1990).
134 See, Respondents Opening Brief in Opposition, Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, (No. 89-1421 1991) [hereinafter Respondents Brief] ( on
file with Cleveland State Law Review.)
135 59 U.S. 519 (1983).
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were "frequently not... part of the class the Sherman Act was designed
to protect, especially in disputes with employers with whom it bar-
gains. ' 16 In Associated General Contractors, the Court held that Congress
had developed federal labor laws as a means to govern labor disputes,
and that the Union in that case did not have standing under the antitrust
laws to assert a cause of action against a multi-employer bargaining
association with which it had a bargaining relationship. 137
In further support, the League argues that the Status Quo Doctrine, a
principle ingrained in labor law and collective bargaining, requires an
employer to maintain the terms and conditions of employment as con-
tained in an expired collective bargaining agreement at least to the point
of impasse in negotiations towards a new agreement. 138 More specifically,
the doctrine prohibits employers from making unilateral changes in work-
ing conditions that are mandatory subjects of bargaining.3 9 This doctrine
establishes that such unilateral action constitutes bad faith, and therefore
subjects the employer to unfair labor practice charges before the NLRB.140
On interlocutory appeal from the district court in Powell, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals devised a standard that, in practice, is not far
removed from that proposed by the NFL.14' Over a stinging dissent that
warned of League violation of the antitrust laws for an indeterminate
length of time,14 2 the court reversed the district court ruling and held
that the labor exemption resulting from a collective bargaining agree-
ment continues to shield the system of restraints for as long as the labor
relationship continues. 143 The court did include a disclaimer of sorts, ac-
knowledging that its opinion should not result in the extension of the
agreement forever, but failed to make a definitive statement as to the
time and manner of its termination. 144 The court went on to include
unilateral changes to the player restraints implemented by the League 145
136 Id. at 539-540.
137 See Roman, supra note 133, at 126. Roman, an attorney with Covington
and Burling, the firm representing the NFL in Powell, makes this argument to
support the League's position that the exemption extends throughout the bar-
gaining relationship.
138 See Respondents Brief, supra note 134, at 12.
139 Laborer's Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advance Lightweight Concrete
Co. Inc., 779 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1987).
140 Id.
141 Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
141 Id. at 568.
143 Id. The court held that "as long as there is a possibility that proceedings
may be commenced before the Board, or until final resolution of board proceedings
and appeals therefrom, the labor relationship continues and the labor exemption
applies." Id. at 568.
- Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d at 568. The court reasoned that, "this does not
entail that once a union and management enter into collective bargaining, man-
agement is forever exempt from the antitrust laws, and we do not hold that
restraints on player services can never offend the Sherman Act." Id.
141 Powell 888 F.2d at 568. The unilateral changes referred to primarily consist
of Plan B Free Agency. While arguments for and against inclusion of Plan B Free
Agency under the non-statutory labor exemption can be advanced, it is clear that
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under the labor exemption umbrella, reasoning that the Union did not
contend that those changes were the result of bad faith.
14
,
In support of its holding, the court referred the Union to the myriad of
economic and legal remedies available to it under federal labor law.1
4 7
The court endorsed continued bargaining, economic pressure through
strikes and picketing in concert with action before the NLRB as the proper
means of resolving this dispute. 14 Underlying this opinion is the belief
that a Union should not be able to win in court that which it is unable
to secure at the bargaining table.
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court, which had held that the appropriate time for the exemption
to terminate was the point at which the parties to an expired agreement
reach impasse as to the restraints in question.149 The district court had
reasoned that the parties to an expired collective bargaining agreement
are governed by the status quo doctrine as asserted by the League, until
a new agreement is reached or until the parties negotiate to the point of
impasse. 15 The district court cited policy reasons embodied in labor law
in support of the status quo doctrine, emphasizing the need to maintain
a stable environment after the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement so that the parties are able to come together in a "non-coercive
atmosphere that is conducive to serious negotiations on a new contract."'-"
there is something intrinsically wrong with a system that severely limits the
mobility of the "best" 37 players on each team, while allowing for the unrestricted
free agency of the bottom tier of players in the League. The result of this dubious
system is that teams bid on the unprotected players and acquire them for salaries
considerably higher than the players that were protected.
As with the Browns situation discussed above, aging veteran players, injured
players and journeymen are generally those who are left unprotected and sub-
sequently paid substantial sums of money to shore up other NFL teams. In the
Browns case, Raymond Clayborn was signed to a contract paying him an average
of $900,000 dollars a year, and one year later, he is seriously considering retire-
ment. The end result of Plan B Free Agency is that the best 37 players are in
double jeopardy; they are put on the protected list, restricting their opportunities
to test their value on the open market, and then watch players that are deemed
unworthy of protection by another team in the League, come to their team at a
significantly higher salary than they are paid. It would prove interesting to see
the fate of Plan B Free Agency if scrutinized under a rule of reason analysis by
the courts.
To quantify the situation, 184 players changed teams under Plan B Free
Agency in 1990, 37 percent of the players eligible to change teams, AP, April 2,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP file. Financially, salaries increased
approximately $12 million dollars over last year, an increase of 70 percent. Id.
1,6 Powell 888 F.2d at 567-68.
141 Id. at 565-66.
148 Id.
149 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).
1o Id. at 784. The court referred to Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 475, 64 LRRM(BNA) 1386 (1967), in defining impasse as the point at which
"good faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agree-
ment."
151 Id. at 785. The district court in Powell quoting Laborers Health and Welfare
Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co. Inc., 779 F.2d 497, 500 (9th
Cir. 1985).
1991]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The court further reasoned that the doctrine warrants the survival of the
labor exemption beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment as a function of maintaining the status quo during good faith ne-
gotiations.5 2
Having determined that the non-statutory labor exemption survives
the expiration of the bargaining agreement, the court turned its attention
to reconcile the conflicting labor law and antitrust interests to discern
the point at which the exemption terminates. In weighing these varied
interests, the court struck a balance between labor policies favoring col-
lective bargaining and judicial non-intervention with antitrust policies
favoring free competition, holding that the player restraints remain
shielded by the exemption until the parties reach impasse as to that
issue. 153 The district court reasoned that the impasse standard serves
labor policy by nurturing good faith bargaining over mandatory subjects
at least until the parties reach stalemate, while respecting antitrust con-
siderations, shielding the restraint from scrutiny only to the point at
which the parties are no longer able to resolve the dispute themselves.'5
It also noted that this standard is consistent with other ramifications
triggered by impasse, such as the employer's right to implement new
policies concerning terms and conditions of employment reasonably con-
sistent with its pre-impasse proposals.1 55 In addition, the impasse stand-
ard as applied by the district court respects an important judicial construct
of the non-statutory labor exemption; antitrust exemptions are disfavored
and are to be narrowly construed. 5 6 By extending the exemption only to
the point of impasse, rather than beyond, as suggested by the League
and the standard established by the Eighth Circuit, the district court
effectively respects this important judicial construction which is virtually
ignored by the Eighth Circuit holding.157
152 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 786 (D.Minn 1988).
15 Id. at 788.
11 Id. at 789.
15, See, e.g., Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 (1988); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v.
NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 415-416 (1982).
"I' See, e.g., Group Health and Life Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
See also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975). In Connell, Justice Powell referred to the non-statutory labor
exemption as "limited", further suggesting that it is to be read narrowly. Id. at
622.
117 Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987). The plaintiffs in Bridge-
man included Junior Bridgeman, David Robinson, Armon Gilliam, Reggie Wil-
liams, Jose Ortiz, Rory Sparrow, Darrell Walker, Phil Hubbard, and Ken Balow.
In Bridgeman, the NBPA brought antitrust charges against the NBA in a district
court in New Jersey. The Bridgeman court evaluated the players' contention that
the non-statutory labor exemption terminated at expiration of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, and examined the impasse standard in formulating its
opinion. Id. at 965-66. In the end, the court held that the labor exemption does
survive the expiration of the bargaining agreement, and continues to shield the
restrictions from antitrust liability for as long as long as the employer "continues
to impose the restriction unchanged, and reasonably believes that the practice,
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One can see in reviewing these alternative termination points, that
striking the proper balance between labor law policies and antitrust in-
terests while accommodating the competing concerns of the parties, is a
difficult task at best. Each of the standards above satisfy some of the
concerns, yet fail to give proper weight to others. For example, the stand-
ard submitted by the players calling for termination of the exemption
upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement serves the prin-
ciples of antitrust law to the fullest, calling for immediate liability of the
bargained for restraints on trade. As a consequence, the expiration stand-
ard fails to give consideration to important labor law policies such as the
status quo doctrine, which requires an employer to maintain terms and
conditions of employment after the expiration of the agreement. 158 This
in turn is said to promote good faith negotiations between the parties
towards a new agreement. As the status quo doctrine lends stability to
the post-collective bargaining agreement negotiations, it must be ac-
corded greater respect in the formulation of a termination point for the
exemption.
In contrast, the standard established by the Eight Circuit Court of
Appeals gives great weight to the policy considerations embodied in labor
law. By allowing the non-statutory labor exemption to survive expiration
of the agreement and extend through impasse to the end of the labor
relationship between the parties, the court pays the utmost respect to the
principles of judicial non-intervention and the freedom of self-determi-
nation.159 However, if a greater weight is given to labor law policies, the
influence of antitrust policy is diminished. Under the court's standard,
once the labor exemption is triggered, the restraint in question can only
be subject to antitrust scrutiny at the inception of a new bargaining
agreement, or at the end of the bargaining relationship.' 0 This conse-
quence carries an even greater impact due to the unique nature of the
bargaining relationship in the instant case. In this context, a restraint
on trade included in a bargaining agreement that comes under the non-
statutory labor exemption may ultimately chill the very policies it claims
to respect. 16 1 Faced with the prospect of eternal exemption from antitrust
or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the next bargaining agreement."
Id. at 967. The court further reasoned that restrictions can be considered uni-
laterally imposed at the point the employer realizes that the Union will not
consent to a collective bargaining agreement that includes such practices. Id. The
court also considered that its test was designed to apply subjectively on a case-
by-case basis, with expiration coming before, during or even after the parties
reach impasse. Id.
118 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
160 Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568. In dissent, Judge Heaney argued that
this was inconsistent with Mackey and that "the exemption should protect illegal
restraints only as long as such restraints are part of bona fide collective bar-
gaining." Id. at 569.6I Id. at 571. Again in dissent, Justice Heaney argues that "[p]layers will be
considerably less likely to enter into any agreement with respect to player re-
straints because of the certainty that the terms of the agreement will become the
terms of employment ad infinitum, unless they strike and win." Id.
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liability, the Union is not likely to consent to any such restraints in a
bargaining agreement in the future. 162 Rather, armed with the knowledge
that the Eighth Circuit ruling basically bars antitrust liability of bar-
gained for restraints, it is difficult to imagine that the NFL will capitulate
to Union demands on the issue of free agency.
The test articulated by the district court in Powell,' 3 comes closest to
balancing labor law policies with interests embodied in antitrust laws by
designating impasse as the point at which the non-statutory labor ex-
emption should terminate. 6 4 This standard respects the labor law prin-
ciples of collective bargaining and self determination by requiring the
parties to negotiate to the point of impasse, which can only be reached
through good faith negotiations.1 65 If a party simply goes through the
motions resisting compromise, or approaches the bargaining table by
stating its position on an issue without intent to enter into good faith
talks, that party is subject to an 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) refusal to bargain charge
before the NLRB.16
In addition to serving the policies of labor law, the impasse standard
also respects antitrust interests favoring competition. This is accom-
plished by allowing the restraints at issue to be shielded from antitrust
liability only to the extent that they may still be included in a subsequent
bargaining agreement. 167 Once impasse is reached as to the issue in ques-
tion, it becomes very unlikely that the parties will reach an agreement
through bona fide good faith negotiations. 168 As it is bona fide good faith
negotiations that initially triggers the non-statutory labor exemption, it
seems appropriate that failure to agree to a restraint should terminate
it. 169
The impasse standard however, is not without weakness. For example,
impasse is considered by some authorities to be only a temporary deadlock
in the negotiations, rather than a termination of bargaining. 170 In addi-
112 Id. Clearly, the concern is that neither side has any reason to bargain
further. The League has the ruling of the court justifying its insistence on theinclusion of the Right of First Refusal/Compensation System in any subsequentbargaining agreement, and the Union is faced with the knowledge that any agreed
upon restraints in a subsequent collective agreement shields the League from
antitrust liability in the future.
163 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).
164/d.
-'See NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1969) (a party
cannot simply "go through the motions," but must bargain in good faith to reach
the point of impasse).
166 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 8(a)(5)(it is an unfair laborpractice for any employer to refuse to bargain) and 8(b)(3)(it is an unfair labor
practice for any labor organization to refuse to bargain).
'67 Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 789.
161 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
170 Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1979). In Bon-
anno, the Court reasoned that impasse is generally temporary, and is often broken
by further negotiation, or the use of economic force. Id.
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tion, it is not always clear when the parties to a negotiation reach im-
passe.17 ' It has also been argued that the labor laws prefer a cautious
approach in determining when further bargaining would be futile, there-
fore adding to the doubt surrounding the question of when impasse is
reached. 172
For these reasons, it becomes clear that the best standard available to
the courts in determining when the non-statutory labor exemption ter-
minates is when the employer implements unilateral changes concerning
the terms and conditions of employment. As noted above, this is only
justified after the bargaining representative of the employees claims that
an impasse has been reached as to the issues in question. 7 3 This standard
allows for the effective balance between the policies of labor law and
antitrust interests attained by the impasse standard, while adding clarity
and definitiveness to its determination. This clarity is achieved because
the employer's unilateral action demonstrates that employee contentions
of impasse are credible and shared.
This standard was advocated by the Solicitor General of the United
States in a Brief to the Supreme Court as amicus curiae.1 7 4 In his brief
to the Court, the Solicitor General reasoned that unilateral change by
the employer "amounts to a tacit admission that the employer (1) has
concluded that impasse has occurred and (2) has had sufficient time to
act on that conclusion."'175 The Solicitor General also urged the Court to
grant certiorari, deeming this a "question of sufficient importance to the
labor and antitrust laws, and to the maintenance of industrial peace" to
warrant review. 76 The Supreme Court's refusal to resolve this conflict
between the policies embodied in federal labor law and those represented
by antitrust laws under Powell has ensured the issue will assert itself
again in the future. Courts facing this issue should frame their inquiry
in a manner consistent with the above considerations.
IV. A SYSTEM OF FREE AGENCY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE NFL
The history of labor relations in professional sports suggests that the
NFL and the players will inevitably return to the bargaining table some-
time in the future. The representative of the players is yet to be deter-
mined, but for the purposes of this exercise, let us assume that the Union
"I See Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 17 and accompanying text. In his brief
for the United States, the Solicitor General argued that, "[i]t is not always clear
even in retrospect-and certainly not always immediately clear to the parties-
precisely when impasse occurs." Id.
1
7 2 Id.
"- See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Laborers Health and Welfare
Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539 (1988); Charles
D. Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1979).
174 See Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 17.
175 Id.
116 Id. at 18.
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will be re-certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the players in
future negotiations. Let us also assume that, as asserted above, the sub-
sequent challenges by individual NFL players will result in judicial rec-
ognition that the NFL Right of First Refusal/Compensation System is
violative of antitrust laws, and that a reformed system of free agency
will be mandated.
Upon return to the bargaining table, it is likely that the Union, opti-
mistic and strengthened by victory in court, will again propose a system
of complete and unrestricted free agency, while the League will seek the
most restrictive system allowable by law. It is at this point that profes-
sional football may turn to the National Basketball Association for an
assist.1
77
In the 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National
Basketball Association [hereinafter "the NBA"] and the National Bas-
ketball Players Association [hereinafter "the NBPA"], a free agency sys-
tem was implemented establishing criteria that categorizes players as
under contract, restricted free agents, and unrestricted free agents.7 8 The
standards by which players are categorized are founded primarily on a
player's time in the league and contractual status with his original
team.179 This system can be modified to resolve the dispute between the
players and the owners, and could be implemented in a manner that
would allow movement of veteran players from team to team, while pro-
tecting the competitiveness and profitability of the league. As the actual
contractual wording is beyond the scope of this article, the following
presents this author's outline of a workable system.
A. Restricted Free Agents
Any player that reaches the end of his contract with a team, and has
been in the league a minimum of four years achieves the status of re-
stricted free agent. As the vast majority of player contracts expire on
February 1 of their final year, a signing period of 28 days will follow
during which the team can pursue one of three options provided. These
options include (1) negotiating a new long-term contract with the player;
(2) signing a one year contract extension at 125 percent of the player's
salary in the final year of the recently expired contract;8 0 or (3) doing
nothing.
177 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Basketball
Association and the National Basketball Players Association art. V, VII, and VIII(March 1, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement].
171 See 1988 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 177, at 40-54.
The system implemented in the NBA varies in limited ways from that proposed
over the following pages, most frequently due to the differences in career longevity
and average salary levels.
'79 Id. Again, the following plan draws from the working model in place in the
NBA in the third year of a five year contract.
"1 This point in the employment relationship between the team and the player
will be considered the "option year."
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As of March 1, players that have not negotiated a new contract with
their old team as per options (1) or (2) above, may negotiate with other
teams around the league culminating in the signing of an offer sheet by
the player and a prospective new club. This period of negotiation and
signing will last fifteen days. If an offer sheet is so obtained by a player,
the original club has until March 31 to evaluate the offer sheet and match
the offer, or decline to do so. If the original club chooses to match the
offer, the player will sign an agreement identical to the offer sheet with
the original club. If not, the offer sheet will be drawn up as a new contract
with the new team.
B. Unrestricted Free Agents
Any player that reaches the end of his contract with a team, and has
been in the league a minimum of six years, or any player that reaches
the end of the option year of a contract achieves the status of unrestricted
free agent. Unrestricted free agents may not negotiate with any team
other than the original team prior to February 1 of the expiration year.181
Thereafter, the services of these players will thenbe acquired by the team
that puts together the most attractive offer for the unrestricted free agent,
and no compensation will be due the original team.
C. Salary Cap
While some of the problems inherent in a system of this kind are avoided
because of the nature of the television contracts with the NFL,182 a salary
cap is still necessary to preclude teams in the bigger media markets1
8 3
from outbidding teams from smaller markets for the best available talent
under the new system. Clearly, the parties to the agreement are apt to
extrapolate their own figures upon which to base the salary cap, but the
following may serve as a guideline.'8
I8 This is the final year in the contractual relationship.
182 See Lock, supra note 3, at 405.
18l United Press International, February 1, 1990, BC cycle, Sports News. The
dilemma that accompanies a system of free agency is essentially very simple: the
teams with the most money to spend on the acquisition of free agent players are
likely to acquire the best talent available. Over time, without a system of checks
in place, a competitive imbalance will develop, with the rich getting richer. This
is most evident in major league baseball, where there is no salary cap in place.
14 Note that all salary figures refer to wages and do not include signing, re-
porting and roster bonuses, or any deferred compensation. Formulating a salary
cap in the initial year can be very complicated, primarily due to the great disparity
between salary expenditures from team to team in the NFL. The following is a
listing of the 28 NFL teams and their respective payrolls from 1989 and 1990
(salaries in millions):
1991]
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NBA and the
NBPA, in implementing a team salary cap, used an average increase of
9.6 percent per year in the formulation of allowable expenditures during
the life of the agreement. 1 5 As a starting point for the salary cap, the
NFL will use $32.6 million dollars for the 1991-92 season. This figure is
based upon the League high of $29.7 million dollars in 1990-91.11 Over
a five year agreement, the salary cap can be structured as follows:
1991-92 $32.6 million
1992-93 $35.9 million
1993-94 $39.3 million
1994-95 $43.2 million
1995-96 $47.1 million
The yearly increases reflected in this structure correlate exactly with
the NBA agreement. 1
87
TEAM
ATLANTA
BUFFALO
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS
DENVER
DETROIT
GREEN BAY
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
L.A. RAIDERS
L.A. RAMS
MINNESOTA
NEW ENGLAND
NEW ORLEANS
N.Y. GIANTS
N.Y. JETS
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
TAMPA BAY
WASHINGTON
AVERAGE
1989
14.3
16.1
15.3
13.2
17.9
15.9
17.1
15.4
14.8
15.8
14.7
16.5
16.5
12.5
15.4
16.7
12.4
17.2
19.5
17.8
16.7
13.8
13.8
20.1
14.9
10.1
17.5
15.6
1990
16.8
20.1
20.4
18.1
20.8
15.2
18.6
17.7
19.9
19.0
19.9
17.9
22.5
18.4
21.5
19.5
15.1
21.2
22.0
20.6
16.3
13.1
16.3
29.7
18.4
16.2
22.2
19.2
% OF INCREASE
17
25
33
37
16
-. 9
8
15
34
20
35
8
36
47
40
17
22
23
13
16
-. 3
-. 6
18
48
23
60
27
23
USA Today, December 12, 1990, at 3C;.
Further complicating this scenario is another season of Plan B Free Agency
signings which promises to drive team salaries to record heights. In light of these
variables, this example will necessarily start from the 1990-91 figure cited above,
and project implementation without an additional round of Plan B signings.
- See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 177, at 68.
186 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
117 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 177, at 68.
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While these numbers look extraordinarily high, a comparison with the
yearly increases over the last several years shows this to be modest in-
crease. 188 This also represents a maximum figure of salary expenditures,
not a mandatory or minimum number, so it should present no undue
burden on any League team. Clearly, teams can and will come in under
these salary figures.
In the alternative, the NBA agreement specified that the cap would be
predicated on the greater of the projected salary numbers referred to
above, or 53 percent of the defined gross revenues of the NBA in each
contract year. 189 This figure would then be divided by the number of teams
to determine the annual salary cap. In the NFL, a similar alternative
can be provided. As with the NBA agreement, defined gross revenues will
consist of all aggregate revenues from the playing season including but
not limited to gate receipts, proceeds from the sale of NFL Broadcasting
Rights, exhibition game gate receipts, and proceeds from post season
games. 190
Under this agreement, teams would not be permitted to exceed the
salary cap except in limited situations. As implemented in the NBA, these
exceptions would include current contractual obligations at the inception
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement adopting this system, and player
contracts entered into for the purpose of replacing a player formerly under
contract with that team, but that is no longer contractually bound due
to injury, waiver, retirement or due to signing as a restricted or unre-
stricted free agent with another team. 191 Replacement contracts signed
by teams already at or over the salary cap can not exceed the salary levels
of the player that is being replaced during the initial year of replacement,
nor can they exceed an increase of greater than ten percent per year as
part of the initial replacement contract. In evaluating this system, it
is important to note that this is simply the skeletal framework of a system
that could be implemented in the NFL to allow greater mobility for the
players in the League, while maintaining the competitive balance that
has developed within professional football. Clearly, there are other issues
that are beyond the scope of this article such as minimum salaries and
benefit packages that must be negotiated between the League and its
players.
I'l See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
'81 See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 177, at 68.
190 Id. at 55-56.
19, Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In sum, de-certification of the National Football League Players As-
sociation and subsequent filings of antitrust actions by individual players
against the League will require the courts to revisit the question of when
the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust liability terminates. As
this becomes necessary, the analysis presented in this note may provide
guidance for the courts and attorneys faced with this issue. In striking
an equitable balance between federal labor policies and antitrust inter-
ests, the courts should find that the proper time for the labor exemption
to terminate is at the time that the League unilaterally implements
changes after impasse. Exposing the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System and Plan B Free Agency to antitrust scrutiny at this juncture
will serve to avoid the injurious consequences of the status quo. It may
also provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to recover its own
fumble in the NFL Player Dispute.
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